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Pe(s)ts and Hosts: *Gulliver's Travels* and the Satiric Critique of Hospitality

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Abstract

In this essay, I argue that Swift's meditation on hospitality in Gulliver's Travels—its repeated restaging of relations between guests and hosts, prisoners and guards, pets and masters—constitutes a theory of satire itself as a relation of hospitality. In the encounter between Gulliver and the Lilliputians, and in the parallel encounters that follow in all four books of the text, questions of hospitality, obligation, and submission are emphasized. This emphasis operates as an avenue for the reader not only to consider Gulliver's (or a traveler's) obligations and liberties within the spaces of colonial or pre-colonial encounter, but also to regard Gulliver as an emblem or figure of satire itself. This role for Gulliver is underwritten by, or operates in parallel with, the ways in which hospitality is figured throughout his voyages.

Keywords: Jonathan Swift; Gulliver's Travels; hospitality; satire; Jacques Derrida; parasite

In this essay, I argue that Swift's meditation on hospitality in *Gulliver's Travels*—its repeated restaging of relations between guests and hosts, prisoners and guards, pets and masters—constitutes a theory of satire itself as a relation of hospitality. In the encounter between Gulliver and the Lilliputians, and in the parallel encounters that follow in all four books of the text, questions of hospitality, obligation, and submission are emphasized. This emphasis operates as an avenue for the reader to do more than consider Gulliver's (or a traveler's) obligations and liberties within the spaces of colonial or pre-colonial encounter. For Gulliver is allowed to become neither a pure travelling observer (as his depiction of his ethnographic tics might have us believe); nor is he allowed to become an "everyman" figure to whom our identification is bound by the text's encouragement. Instead, Swift invites us to regard Gulliver as an emblem or figure for satire itself. This role for Gulliver is underwritten by, or operates in parallel with, the ways in which hospitality is figured throughout his voyages.

Like Martinus Scriblerus, the character created by Swift and his fellows in the Scriblerian circle of writers, Gulliver is *in effect* the animation of satire itself, a virtual embodiment of the role of satire in relation to its hosts and guests.[i] But as we see in the opening encounters of the novel, the possibilities for satire in its encounter with others (other bodies, other individualities, and other texts) are far from settled. *Gulliver's Travels* is a navigation through the possibilities of satire's relation to the world, a character progress that, were we inclined to produce a Hogarthian title, we might call "the progress of satire." It is a tale of the traps and misuses to which satire can fall and be put, and it is finally a performance of the one necessary aspect of satiric writing, for the Scriblerians: satire's ability to maintain ambivalence toward all roles, all obligations, and all final judgments, even as it also refuses to abandon its attempts to engage with the world. The novel proposes hospitality as a model for ethical relationships amongst subjects, including text and reader, author and world, while also reflecting on the risks that modernity, with its privileging of economistic logics, necessarily represents for such orientations, both interpersonal and literary.

I. Lilliput: spectacle and the parasitism of satire

After *The Swallow* breaks apart, and Gulliver, ejected by the sea, wakes from his sleep, he finds himself tied to the earth, tangled with the surface from which he would normally rise. What follows is at first a less than human encounter—the encounter of the sensation of a parasite making its way upon the body: "In a little time I felt something alive moving on my left Leg, which advancing gently forward over my breast, came almost up to my Chin" (*GT* 23). With this descriptive focus on sensation, the text suspends itself in the phenomenology of the moment: we do not yet understand that Gulliver is describing a meeting. There is, evidently, an encounter, but it is not yet apparent with whom: man, beast, or absolute other. The clarification that follows this sensation of inhuman movement upon Gulliver's body, once he catches sight of his Lilliputian captors, allows the uncanny resolution of human shapes to relieve us from the tension of a possible encounter with an exotic beast. Gulliver's immediate reaction is to roar violently, ridding his body of the miniature human forms. He is apparently revolted by the demands such a presence makes on his body, demands that extend from what at first seemed to be a parasitical relationship to those represented by a relation of hospitality, of welcome presence. Gulliver is unwilling to become either kind of host in these initial moments.

The words "*Hekinah Degul*" are the first of the strangers' sounds that Gulliver transcribes for us, and are left untranslated (oddly so—in a text full of the display of Gulliver's eventual mastery of translation). Gulliver wants nothing more than to break his bonds in the face of this uncanny spectacle of untranslatable, miniature humanity. Freeing his left arm, his first action is to *seize them*. Their arrows repulse him, allowing the escape of those that had been

near him. This act of violent seizure will later be narrated by Gulliver as opening to the most dominating of relations between humankind and reviled animal pest. Seized by the Brobdignagian farmer, Gulliver recounts: "I apprehended every Moment that he would dash me against the Ground, as we usually do any little hateful Animal which we have a mind to destroy" (*GT* 83). But it goes unexplained, here. The encounter with the small, human-featured Lilliputians has left Gulliver bewildered and fiercely defensive.

The first half of the scene then stages an apparent encounter between a human narrator and a crowd of bestial forms that are gradually coming to be thought of by our narrator as human. This process is accelerated by the production of a stage, on which a long speech is presented by a figure "who seemed to be a Person of Quality" who "acted every part of an Orator" (*GT* 25). This oration communicates nothing, in a literal sense, but Gulliver is clearly moved by it to consider what he had not considered until this point: making gestures of submission and need. The oration's power indicated by this shift in our narrator's approach is that of a sublimity of station, one that is neither strange to Gulliver (he identifies it as "Quality") nor hidden by the barriers of language. The production, performed on the makeshift stage near Gulliver's face, communicates the grandeur of spectacle. Gulliver is neither fully won over by this grandiloquence, but neither is he unaffected, and his change of tactic shows it. His attempt to communicate and satisfy his own hunger indicates that he has returned into a consideration of himself as linguistic subject, engaged in an interaction in which *something* might be communicated. Rather than trying to kill the tiny person of eminence, Gulliver identifies with the spectacle of Quality that he performs, and with the position made subject by that quality.

Gulliver's entrance into the exchange, however, intensifies and makes explicit his relationship to the person of eminence. Immediately, through Gulliver's request for food, he himself becomes an ambivalently witting and willing *part* of the spectacle of grandeur. This entanglement is achieved by way of hospitality. Very quickly we find the tables reversed—instead of an unknown parasite on the body of a tabula rasa, we now see Gulliver becoming himself a guest whose as-yet unfathomed hunger places him in the constant debt of his hosts. Gulliver reveals to us, however, that this spectacle of hospitality had been planned in advance: "above an hundred of the Inhabitants mounted, and walked towards my Mouth, laden with Baskets full of Meat, which had been provided, and sent thither by the King's Orders upon the first Intelligence he received of me" (*GT* 25). Here Gulliver reveals to us a certain political cynicism, so that the great oration and its ensuing scene of massive hospitality turn out to have been less than spontaneous.[ii] And the spectacle is far beyond the bounds of hospitality even for a royal visit. Festive hospitality for foreign dignitaries had become a thing of nostalgic myth by the early eighteenth century.[iii] A reader is certainly most likely to experience such a massive production of welcome as an exceptional extravagance. And we are asked to notice and identify with the audience's enthusiastic consumption of this

spectacle: those who watch Gulliver endlessly devour their supplied feast display "a thousand Marks of wonder and astonishment at my Bulk and Appetite" (*GT* 25). Gulliver perceives that the popular perception of his drinking and eating is that they are "Wonders" (*GT* 26), displays of uncanny or preternatural capacity. The astonishment at the wonders presented to them brings the crowd together as crowd—that is, it amasses their bodies, perceptions, and responses.[iv] They cry in unison, but this response provokes an odd reaction in Gulliver, a violent turn that yet again goes unexplained.

Unless we consider Gulliver's admission of the temptation of violence against the crowd of Lilliputians (now humanized by both their hospitable endeavors as well as their clear affective responses to his virile displays of consumption) as continuing in the pattern of disgust directed at vermin, we are left perhaps unable to identify with his narration here. It is another prominent moment in which an ambivalent judgment seems to be taking place, one that may communicate to us something of the character of our narrator. Gulliver tells us that

> I confess I was often tempted, while they were passing backwards and forwards on my Body to seize Forty or Fifty of the first that came in my reach, and dash them against the Ground. But the remembrance of what I had felt, which probably might not be the worst they could do, and the Promise of Honour I made them, for so I interpreted my submissive Behaviour, soon drove out these Imaginations. (*GT* 26)

Again, this disgust takes place as a revulsion against the presence of vermin on his body—the presence of a parasite, an invader. As Gulliver represses this violent urge (and is thereby able to enter Lilliputian society), he comes to interpret his submission as a contract. But he also adds one final contractual obligation here, a binding debt that seems to be more objective in its requirement of the repression of violence: "Beside, I now consider'd my self as bound by the Laws of Hospitality to a People who had treated me with so much Expence and Magnificence" (*GT* 26).

In Lilliput, the coordinates of the journey through worldly negations and identifications to satiric ambivalence are those of hospitality and spectacle. Gulliver's reception of hospitality is thoroughly appropriated by the art of political spectacle, so that even as he becomes the guest of the Lilliputians, he also becomes the tool of political factions (against his professed wishes) that each seek to have the population see his power and capacity as an element of their own operation.[v] At first it is the King and his emissaries who have used the "Laws of Hospitality" to capture Gulliver within the operations of political spectacle. These coordinates allow us to ask questions of the role of satire: is satire a parasite on the body of the work that it references? In this, Swift's text anticipates the question that Jacques Derrida identifies as thoroughly entangled with any prospect of hospitality: "How can we distinguish between a guest and a parasite?" (Derrida, 59). And in fact, *Gulliver's Travels* is thoroughly preoccupied with this difficulty. Does satire find itself obligated to submit to the sovereign

power of its host? What kind of submission would allow satire to remain activated as a continuing process of navigation? How does satire risk being used as (political) spectacle, and how does it properly resist this appropriation?

The new perception that what he has submitted to is the Laws of Hospitality transforms Gulliver's still-violent fantasies of power. He considers, in retrospect, that at his discovery his hosts could have attempted to kill him while he slept. "I should certainly have awaked with the first sense of Smart, which might so far have roused my Rage and Strength, as to have enabled me to break the Strings wherewith I was tied; after which, as they were not able to make Resistance, so they could expect no Mercy" (*GT* 27-8). His imagination of power is tied to an imagination of "Liberty," an object he never ceases to request throughout his sojourn in Lilliput (and a figure that returns at the end of the Brobdingnagian captivity of Part 2). We are to think here of course of English or British liberty, the most commonplace of England's eighteenth century nationalist rhetoric of identity.[vi] But embedded in this scene in which both hospitality and a political subjection (Gulliver as tool for political spectacle) are established, the request for liberty that Gulliver makes to the representative of the King is directed at what is felt by Gulliver to be a binding hospitality, a hospitality that has been mobilized for other ends than for his own sake. The fantasy with which Gulliver associates liberty is, however, not much more attractive to us: his wish to be able to once again see the common Lilliputians, their crowds, as vermin, and to show them "no Mercy," is hardly an attractive model of hospitality in its own right. Here we have the figure of satire caught between a violent hatred of servitude, a resentment of the debts of hospitable obligation, and a wish to assert its power in the act of real negation, remaking the world according to its disgust with the situation it has been given. Felicity Heal notes that within early modern hospitable relations, the guest could assert a kind of power that played on the host's vulnerabilities *as* host. "The guest, by abusing his role, could reverse the power relationship that was implicit in the giving of hospitality, and could reveal the weakness of the host who exposed himself through generosity and openness" (Heal, 149). Gulliver does not pursue this possibility, but certainly readers are to see in his temptations towards it this reversal implicit within hospitality. He is seduced into an acceptance of his submission, and chooses this possibility rather than breach the reciprocal relations into which he has entered.

The liberty that Gulliver finally receives embeds him even further within the production of political spectacle. The "Articles" offered the *Man-Mountain* (a phrase both manipulatively flattering and, when emphasized in his narrative, a sign of Gulliver's boastful pride) act to legislate his utility for use by both the King/Emperor and the rival factions of government. This production of spectacle had already been significantly intensified while Gulliver was not yet at "liberty" by a set of grand occasions produced by the court in their treatment of their guest. The Emperor had made a great event of his approach to Gulliver, advancing ceremoniously but unnecessarily on horseback, ordering his retinue to feed and quench the

chained stranger's hunger and thirst. The very feeding of Gulliver is by necessity a spectacle, requiring the parade of "a sort of Vehicles on Wheels" stuffed with the food he will eat (in what will no doubt seem, to the Lilliputians, in addition to its unimaginable quantity, a monstrous haste). The Emperor's "Priests and Lawyers" are present at this scene to make their own addresses to the newcomer.

Most striking, however, and of significance for the political effects of this production, is Gulliver's reaction to the unruly crowd, who in what the narrative describes as their indiscipline are unable to prevent themselves from shooting arrows at him. The perpetrators of this disorder are "seized" by the Colonel (i.e. the master of ceremonies), and are given to Gulliver, placed "bound into [his] Hands" (*GT* 32). Just as he has fantasized, Gulliver now has defenseless Lilliputians in his grasp, and seems to be at least offered the license to show "no Mercy" if it pleases him. But wrapped in the imperial spectacle, Gulliver cannot undertake such an action. He gives us no indication of the reason for his leniency. Gathered in the arms of the spectacle, Gulliver has become a subject to its rhetorical production of imperial majesty, military order, and legal and religious wisdom. He finds himself asked, in the donation of these unruly commoners, to add to the strength of the spectacle—in a sense, he is here interpellated by its recognition of him as a worthy actor. He is also welcomed into a "liberty" of action whose frame of possibility is delimited by the political expediency of every publicly visible gesture.

Given this entanglement within political spectacle, Gulliver the guest has no choice but to spend his liberty in a manner that will not offend his hosts. The alternative would be to identify with the unruly and common crowd that he has repeatedly imagined, even in the midst of their exceptional donations, as vermin to be destroyed. Satire, we might say, finds itself put to use by power, engaged in the aesthetic reinforcement of the grand ceremonies of government, and is figured as being caught in a structure of hospitality that requires that it do so. Gulliver acts with a new softness after being given the role of executioner. "[L]ooking mildly… I set him gently on the Ground, and away he ran" (*GT* 32). This is immediately resituated in terms of its spectacular effects: "I treated the rest in the same manner, taking them one by one out of my Pocket, and I observed both the Soldiers and the People were highly obliged at this Mark of my Clemency, which was represented very much to my Advantage at Court" (*GT* 32).

The articles of liberty function to route all of Gulliver's free behavior into paths that will lead to political utility for those in power, and those vying within power. Couched as indications of the government's concern with the safety of the population, they also establish procedures by which this concern with safety can be transformed into ceremony. "He shall not presume to come into our Metropolis, without our express Order; at which time the Inhabitants shall have two Hours warning to keep within their Doors" (*GT* 43). How useful and concerned the government can be, even as it shows itself to have entirely made a submissive and legally-

bound subject out of the *Man-Mountain.* For Gulliver, this liberty has entailed further servitude, even as his "Chains were immediately unlocked" (*GT* 44). Gulliver's limited freedom of motion is predicated on a contractual obligation to support the government's ability to enact itself through spectacle. Within this configuration, it turns out that, even before the encounter between Gulliver and the Lilliputians took place, it was already staged within this struggle between the government and the populace. Hospitality, as decreed by the government, operates to draw attention to the public face of power through its performance of largesse, especially when faced with the challenge of the *Man-Mountain*.

If we are to consider Gulliver as an emblematic figure for satire, we can begin to consider that Gulliver' sojourn in Lilliput is predicated on the swelling of the self-importance of satiric writing, its interpellation into political subjectivity through a seductive flattery. If satire is a *Man-Mountain* faced with the occasion of encounter with people miniature by comparison, it has acquired this sublimity by means of the role it has taken on for official and factional vectors of power. The power that satire can serve inflates it, making ceremonious its great capacity for consumption, phallic endowment (see *GT* 42 for the grand military procession that passes admiringly under the holes in colossal Gulliver's breeches), and even defecation. Satire has, in other words, *always already met with co-optation*, so that it has already become entangled with power, even faction. Any pretense of purity is either another element of the ceremonious spectacle of grandeur allowed to satiric writing by those who fund it, or it means taking up a position with the people against some identified target of misused power.

This last possibility is clearly derided by the encounters of Part 1. The people are vermin to Gulliver, and their safety is only guaranteed by the interests of the government. Why is it that Scriblerian satire cannot find it possible to identify with the position of the "rabble" (*GT* 32), that it in fact situates itself in opposition to populist politics? The difference between the crowds of gawkers and the grandiloquence of political ceremony resides in the status accorded rhetoric in each situation. Gulliver's treatment from the position of sovereignty makes it clear that for the Lilliputian ruler all rhetorical effect, all of the ability of writing and speech to *transport* their audience, must have as the basis of its operation the *telos* of sovereignty itself. In contrast to this, the popular crowds so despicable to Gulliver (and to Swift and Pope elsewhere) seem immune to the power of sublime rhetoric. Sublimity as it exists for Swift (in its emergence from Boileau's translation of Longinus from the Greek in the late seventeenth century) requires a certain semi-autonomous space, a certain license from political power in order for its performances to find a stage.[vii] The transport that Longinus assigns to sublime oratory, and which contributed to the Scriblerians' understanding of the possibilities of writing, occurs in the crowd as "Astonishment" and "Wonder," which turn out to have been only reactive affects to staged spectacles. Longinian "transport," in which shared linguistic exchange is predicated on the intensity of occasion, and thus on the rhetorical production of *events*, requires a position neither aligned with power nor with

popular sentiment, but inevitably attached to both. The crowd's wonder and astonishment (or its unruly resistance to military, legal, or priestly order) operate to maintain the crowd *as crowd*. *Gulliver's Travels* proposes that they are less total capitulations to the spectacle presented than they are ways of fending off complete submission, a form of resistance peculiar to masses.[viii] From the perspective of satire, both the masses and the seat of power (including its concomitant factions) are thoroughly, and unacceptably, self-interested.

But Gulliver is self-interested as well—as I propose above, no one escapes this text unscathed. It is not pure selflessness that seems to drive him from Lilliput and Blefescu, but an individualist mobility that preserves a sort of "liberty." But this liberty is not *merely* the British ideologeme that, as Linda Colley has described, cathects desires onto the empire.[ix] By means of the tale of encounter and, ultimately, release (or escape) with which we are presented in Part 1, we understand that what Gulliver seeks can be articulated in its opposition to the spectacular hospitality offered to placate the masses and to inculcate his own subjection. What Gulliver wants is to navigate the world free of the experience of parasitism, whether it is his own parasitic dependence upon a host who willingly capitalizes on that debt, or the parasitic operations of the masses of Lillputians whose relation to Gulliver is reoriented toward their own resistances to discipline. The "desire" of satire is, in other words, for a hospitality that is not always already staged as manipulative spectacle—a relation to its others that might not result in primarily an aggrandizement of the satirist or the power with which the satire is aligned.

Here, I propose that Swift expresses concern about the *economic* relations of the hospitality that encapsulates satire. Freud articulates something very close to this in his analysis of the joke and its relation to hospitality, especially to gift-giving. For Freud, the joke operates as a gift exchange that requires not two but three parties—satire partakes of this structure to a significant extent, although its indirection and ambivalence mean that its function is more complex than that of the joke (which Freud shows to be itself a very complex relation). Freud proposes that "the psychical process of the joke is consummated between the first person, the 'I', and the third, the person from outside."[x] The third person, who has no proper place in the relationship between persons one and two, receives the joke as a gratuitous donation. "The psychical process in the listener, in the joke's third person, can scarcely be more aptly characterized than by emphasizing that he purchases the pleasure of the joke with a very small expenditure of his own. He is made a present of it, as it were" (*Joke* 143). Similarly, in the relation amongst satire, political power, and reader, the exchange produces an economy of accumulation for the power that licenses and appropriates satiric writing, or a debt of allegiance for the reader. Instead of offering the reader (or, standing in for a reader, the people of Lilliput) a gift exchange in which satire requires no reciprocality, no response of a donation of allegiance, worship, or respect, the conjunction of satire with the license provided by political power operates within the rhetoric of hospitality while only conferring obligation.

Satire must burden itself with the need to escape this role if it is to find a way to operate within a less economic form of exchange. To find its liberty, economic and political, satire cannot ally itself with faction, and attempts to remain affiliated with the central power instead of biased faction reveal the fact that faction already exists at the site of sovereignty. Gulliver and satire have to leave aside all such affiliations in order to maintain a properly ethical relationship with their "others."

II. Brobdingnag: Satire the Pe(s)t

In Brobdingnag, the text offers a series of meditations on hospitality that center on the roles of pests and pets, and the transition between these two positions. Gulliver at first imagines the massive difference in scale in terms of the *Odyssey*'s scene of the inhospitable encounter with the Cyclops. Gulliver hides himself from those giants he thinks of from the start as "monsters," projecting onto them the aggression of Polyphemus as they stride across their demesnes. Gulliver's capture reveals his status to be objectively similar to that of Odysseus—the giants identify him, and he sees himself, as a pest, as vermin, as a parasite. Gulliver internalizes this status quickly—he cowers not merely because of the vulnerability of his miniscule size, but because he apprehends that he seems to be a pest to the farmers, an unwelcome guest. "I apprehended every Moment that he would dash me against the Ground, as we usually do any little hateful Animal which we have a mind to destroy" (*GT* 83). Gulliver's supplication to the farmer cannot therefore become instantly translated into political spectacle—instead, it is the supplication of a vermin toward the possibility of its domestication, the equivalent of an apparently "friendly" pest whose geniality toward humans makes it suitable for being tamed. The text depicts the process by which domestication is apprehended by the Brobdignagians, as the farmer's wife "screamed and ran back as Women in England do at the Sight of a Toad or Spider" before determining that the little *splacknuck* Gulliver is not merely a pest. Gulliver represents, in Part 2, a pe(s)t, by which parenthetically interrupted term I mean to indicate the process by which a pest, or parasite, becomes domesticated, brought into a certain kind of hospitality, and reconfigured as pet.

This process of domestication works in two directions. Gulliver is ostensibly "tamed," which is to say, acculturated in that limited way that a subaltern species is acculturated to domestic life in pethood. But the domestic perception is for a moment altered, as what would normally excite revulsion is made familiar, brought into the fold of hospitality. Just as with the text's concern in Part 1 that swelling the head of satire, so to speak, makes it susceptible to political manipulation, here it is satire's vulnerability to a domestication that looks and feels to some extent like the accession to a position of status and centrality to social life, but which is limited by the subalterneity of a pet, which is to say, a kind of writing that cannot be granted real and serious concern about the social life in which it is immersed. If satire's wild exteriority towards the human scene is nevertheless colored by its incomplete revulsion, its

conflicted desire to be both exterior and included, this ambivalence makes it particularly vulnerable to a kind of domestication that disables it. Gulliver's transition from pest to pet is an allegorical anxiety over the possibility that satire is to be forced to traverse this very path.

Thus the most apparent and prominent satiric feature of the chapter, Gulliver's repeated expression of disgust made possible by his diminished perspective, is a redirected form of satiric externality, an attempt to achieve critical externality from within a position of diminutive entrapment. Its expression as critique is hampered by the immersion, so that no one can share Gulliver's antipathy toward the revealed horrors of the human body. Except, that is, for the reader, who can feel disgusted at the "truth" of human sexual, medical, and excremental revelations. This offers the reader a kind of return of repressed bodily function, but not much distance from these revelations, so that what seems to operate as satiric defamiliarization fails to circulate beyond a kind of momentary revulsion, or in its most extended circulation takes the form of self-loathing. This self-loathing, and the disgust that produces it, is indicative of the *deformed* operation of satire from within the position of submissive yet resentful domesticity of Gulliver the pet. If satire falls into domestication, its energies of disgust can only be motivated by *ressentiment*, and fail to produce the externalizing distance that satire needs in order to maintain itself and its role as critical writing. Gulliver as pe(s)t illustrates the muffling of the effect of satiric disgust, opening up the corpuscular only as a kind of stifled redirection of satiric excoriation into *ressentiment.*

The resentments come in large part from Gulliver's enforced performances as marvel or wonder for the gawking crowds. He is made to perform mechanically in a spectacle that mimics the human (or Brobdignagian), but the performance clearly resonates with the assertion that Gulliver is *not* human—the wonder is that there could be such a human pet. It's not hard to see that this performance, entertaining or laboring for human status but always falling short, resonates with slavery and the slave trade in domestic servants. Srinivas Aravamudan writes of Aphra Behn's *Oroonoko, or, The Royal Slave* in terms of that tale's heroic and royalist title character's struggle with the domesticating forces of slavery, only perhaps to succumb to the domesticating features of the narrator's textual desire. Aravamudan notes that "Africans seized for the slave trade were also transported to England and sold as pets and domestic servants" in the period preceding the 1772 Somerset decision (Aravamudan, 34).[xi] The narrator of Behn's tale "caresses" this recalcitrant object of trade, performing a second-order domestication predicated on the nobility and power of Oroonoko's struggle to resist submitting fully to the dehumanized status of slavery. The story of the "pet-king" and his demise thus dramatizes the domesticating influence of the caress, operating first as an empathetic restitution to the dehumanizing effects of slavery, but nevertheless encompassing the rehumanized subject within what Aravamudan calls an "honorary subjectivity" (44). From the arc of Behn's narrative, Aravamudan postulates that

> [p]ets, once acquired and privatized, can be suspended from their earlier participation in the public sphere as objects, taking on an honorary subjectivity. The initial status of the pet subject is honorary, or virtualized, because it depends on the contingent and fetishized investment of the owner. The owner's disinvestment returns the pet to the identity of an objective commodity in the marketplace. (44)

This virtual subjectivity, which operates in the state of exception made possible by a grace or donation—an act of giving, of the gift—may or may not ask its beneficiary to make good on the debt incurred. This account of Oroonoko's enslavement and subsequent emplotment allows us to take note, however, of the double maneuver being depicted in both that text and in *Gulliver's Travels*. The pet is "acquired" and then "privatized," the second a separate intensification of the first act of appropriation of an already tamed individual. Gulliver's sojourn in Brobdingnag is marked by a division between these two moments—Gulliver's status as laborer for the mercenary gain of the farmer is followed by his reception of the royal donation of honorary status in the household and at the table of the King and Queen. Gulliver's domestication is fulfilled or completed as he takes on the status of honorary subject whose well-being is now fetishized as that kind of care which we lavish on pets.[xii] Gulliver's acceptance into royal company is predicated not on his worth but on the need for a fetish through which the performance of the largesse of care, grooming, and sympathy allows the Brobdingnagians to reassert their prerogative and to redirect their sympathetic behaviors away from each other toward an object of display.

Gulliver the pet is thus, as a fetish, a conduit through which human subjectivity exerts both its distance from the animal world and its predication on hospitality and hospitable relations with others. Hospitality towards the pet is a staged and "virtual" hospitality in its separation from social relations—humans can relate to each other through the act of hospitable generosity and care towards the pet, but this does not produce or ensure generous and hospitable relations directed elsewhere. Glumdalclitch's hospitality is a prime example of this staging. Gulliver persistently describes Glumdalclitch as caring, generous, and kind, the only Brogdingnagian who displays such unmixed care and adulation towards him. The caring attention of the child only reinforces the distance between Gulliver and a real intervention in social life—the adults are no more likely to treat Gulliver as anything but a living doll, or pet, given his benefactor's age and maturity. Gulliver necessarily begins to identify with this virtual and donated subjectivity, expressing deep affection for Glumdalclitch's display of sympathy towards her pet (*GT* 91) and resentment at his greatest competitor for the petty hospitality of the royal family, the queen's Dwarf (*GT* 102-3; 108).

Gulliver's subjectification into pethood is brought to its culmination in his great oratorical performance, in which he is asked to account for himself (and his country) by the Brobdingnagian king. Speaking from within this interpellation, the little domesticated man

puffs himself up to his maximum grandeur in order to give the effect of autonomous largesse to his countrymen, and by extension, himself. The king reductively shrugs this off, refusing to allow Gulliver to take the form of anything other than a diminutive demi-human in his estimation, and likewise judging the Britons by means of this association: "'I cannot but conclude the Bulk of your Natives to be the most pernicious Race of little odious Vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the Surface of the Earth" (*GT* 123).

Swift allows the perspective of the king to serve as a satirical vision, here, and we cannot help but feel perturbed by the defamiliarizing effects of Gulliver's discourse on gunpowder (*GT* 124). The progress of satire-as-pe(s)t depicted in the Brobdingnag episode is one in which a too-domesticating license has brought satire's perspective into the fold of established order, so that satire can only produce a critical discourse that supplicates itself to the power it serves, refusing except through periodic tics of disgust to find fault with that position. What is more, satire's version of critique within this domestication is one that can only be uttered as ventriloquized by the sovereign moral perspective. The satirist must bow to a superior moral position in order to produce, through this supplication to a higher morality, a critical distance between itself and its object. In this affinity with an ideal, Swift's tale is arguing, satire negates itself and the positive effects of its own position. Gulliver's Brobdingnagian pe(s)thood is a process by which satire transitions from a status of verminous irritant to a status of supplicating pet.

But this transition finds satire again thoroughly evacuated for itself, allowing only the voice of the morally ideal to operate, refusing itself anything but the most morally pure doctrinal judgment to hold sway. While this form of judgment is perhaps *closer* to the mode of operation that Scriblerian satire apparently wishes to promote than that of mercenary attachment to faction or political spectacle, it refuses something which for satire is as crucial as its morally corrective idealism. When Gulliver expresses his baffled incomprehension at the Brobdingnagian king's failure to accept the gift of the secret of gunpowder, we glimpse something of what remains unrepresented by satire in its pe(s)thood. Gulliver's shock that a "Prince possessed of every Quality which procures Veneration, Love and Esteem" would fail to immediately grasp an opportunity to make him "absolute Master" over his enemies (*GT* 125), betrays the distance that exists between his own ethical standpoint (which here represents also that of his countrymen and their cultural heritage) and that of the ideal, effectively satirizing himself for us as an individual blind to his own cultural biases. But if the ideal is to become the only vehicle for satiric perspective, only negation can take place. Gulliver expresses surprise in part because he is blind to his own deficiencies, and in part because the perspective of the ideal that shows him to be deficient does not explain how, or show how these deficiencies might be transformed or overcome. When the satiric voice is that of the master, the ideal, then the effect of satire is only negation, and the individual writer can only become that of a domesticated vessel whose own identity is made worthless and of

no import to the transaction taking place. It is not that the king is a tyrant, here—it is that pe(s)thood does not do justice to the position of the satirist within the very tradition or culture that he takes as his topic. If only the voice of the ideal is allowed to speak, satire becomes a rigid denunciation in which subjectification becomes only a constantly recursive process of becoming pe(s)t, a domesticated subjectivity with only the mastery embodied in the ideal to credit for its ethical achievements.

Satire for the Scriblerians is then the negotiation of the possibility of hospitality within the encounter of reading. *Gulliver's Travels* depicts the varying resistances, abuses, and difficulties involved in the act of this negotiation. The satiric writer must fend off appropriation, domestication, and, as we see in Part 3, modernization. In Part 4, we are faced with a situation in which Gulliver, unable to accept his species identity with the Yahoos, capitulates to his captors in a way that the text treats with some mild but significant irony. Turning on his British origins, Gulliver identifies with his Master Houyhnhnm and becomes critic of one culture and partisan to another. Given the reluctance the text displays towards partisan alignment in Part 1, this can seem like no solution to the reader. The text's pessimistic ending suggests that a satiric aesthetics can be satisfied with no home-bound model of hospitality, and the reader is left with the text's unfulfilled desire for hospitable encounter that had never managed to emerge. Claude Rawson argues of Swift's general tendency to depict "figures of enclosure," "little worlds made cunningly, nested boxes" that "[t]he suggestion of enclosure, it might be added, tends in satire, and especially in Swift, to become that of a vast incriminating net rather than that of a beautiful home" (Rawson, 91). This *unheimlich* process of failure of hospitable encapsulation operates with an accompanying but inarticulate hope to provide the impetus for *Gulliver's Travels*.

III. Critical Hospitality: Gulliver in Houyhnhnmland

"At last," begins Gulliver, in the seminal encounter of his fourth journey, "I beheld several Animals in a Field, and one or two of the same kind sitting in Trees. Their shape was very singular, and deformed, which a little discomposed me, so that I lay down behind a Thicket to observe them better" (*GT* 207). Much of great value has been written about the colonial implications of Gulliver's encounter with the Yahoos and his struggle to articulate a sense of self that can successfully express a difference from what he identifies as their disgusting bestiality. What I will add to the body of concern with Gulliver's stay with the Houyhnhnms is the argument that, read as the character of personified satiric writing, Gulliver's transformation in the land of the stoic horses is one by which he assumes the role of the critic, the most vilified character in the pantheon of the Scriblerian mythology. The critic is the figure who has internalized the enthusiasm of modernity. More than even the projector, the

critic (often represented, especially in the early works of the group, in the person of Bentley or Wotton) is the figure "who will destroy the human and intellectual past for his own gain" (Weinbrot, 143). The projecting scientist is forced to make his claims of innovation and progress from a quasi-universal and utopian position. The critic pronounces judgment on learning from a thoroughly individualized position, operating parasitically on the writings of others in the name of individual credit. If, for the Swift of *A Tritical Essay upon the Faculties of the Mind* the critics are "at Best, but the Drones of the learned World, who devour the honey, and will not work themselves," then it is implicit in this position that satire must distance itself significantly and decisively from criticism, producing either its own honey or laboring to replace what it consumes (*Tritical Essay*, I.249). Faced with the Houyhnhnms's stoic and rational ethos that would seem to condemn both the Yahoos and the British to the status of vermin, Gulliver accepts this position wholesale and becomes its proselyte, attempting to make himself as clean of the category of human that he can in his advocacy for reason and his revulsion toward animality. Because he can belong to neither side, and because he is set on self-inflation, he operates in Houyhnhnmland as the inhospitable critic, parasitically espousing the Houyhnhnms against their plague of vermin.

If the critic is he who "is as careful as he can, to watch diligently, and spy out the filth in his way… with a design to come out as cleanly as he may," then Gulliver is reminded of a literalized form of this need for cleanliness early in his encounter with the Yahoos (*Tritical Essay*, I.56). Having hastily struck one of them with the blunt of his short sword, he has retreated in the face of what is clearly a social response on the part of the group. "[T]hey began to discharge their Excrements on my Head" (*GT* 208), he complains. Gulliver has made a mistake from which he now learns: the enraged mob will embroil him in their disorder if he acts aggressively toward them. Rejecting and rejected by the rabble before any encounter can occur, satire progresses to align itself what it determines to be the antithesis of the animalistic crowd.

This disordered, unclean human unruliness is opposed by the rational and oral culture of the clean and ordered Houyhnhnms. Among the Houyhnhnms' many admirable qualities, the discipline of their social affects allows for what resembles an undiminished hospitality. "*Friendship* and *Benevolence* are the two principal Virtues among the *Houyhnhnms*, and these not confined to particular Objects, but universal to the whole Race. For a Stranger from the remotest Part is equally treated with the nearest Neighbour, and wherever he goes, looks upon himself as at home" (*GT* 246). Here, Gulliver is referencing the very Law of Hospitality that informs his behavior in his encounter with the Lilliputians.[xiii] Oriented not merely towards familiar and expected guests but towards the proper treatment of strangers, the notion of a Law of Hospitality was a crucial element of aristocratic ideology that had receded into virtual non-existence by the eighteenth century—into a component of the republican nostalgia of Bolingbroke and the Tory opposition.[xiv] The largesse in the relationship between

hosts and guest here is entirely one-sided—it will turn out that Gulliver has absolutely nothing that he could offer his hosts, and indeed, they will gradually retreat from their hospitable acceptance of his presence into a demand that he be forced out—a parallel to his treatment in Lilliput, but a movement produced by different forces.[xv]

Satire aligns itself with the rational horses against the animalistic rabble, allowing for the powerful defamiliarization of the category 'human' that we experience in the fourth voyage. The bathos of human filth is presented as the truth of the animal state of the species, so that any distance from this filth towards cleanliness is depicted as a culturation away from this nature, a metamorphosis of the animal into the rational sublime. The sentiment with which we are left at the text's end is that this is an impossible formulation—Gulliver has been convinced by the Houyhnhnms that their experiences with the base features of the human animal show the incorrigible absence of sublimity of the species, and thrust back by the sentence of life among his kind, he lives his days in resentment of their perceived failings. In the process of coming to love his captors and hate his own animal nature, Gulliver comes to enact that kind of critical practice that mobilized more of the Scriblerians' ire than any other. Filled with the enthusiasm of the Houyhnhnms' rejection of the Yahoos, Gulliver internalizes it, condemning persistently his own species for the filth that they manage only to hide with a veneer of posture and clothing (his own clothes baffle the Houyhnhnms, and clearly embody in their way the practice of saying the "thing which is not"). Refusing his own identity with the species he has identified as filthy, Gulliver thinks of himself as the clean one, the hero that the narrator of *A Tale of a Tub* describes as overinflated with his own self-importance to the extent that his continued presence becomes a social problem. Just as with the

> Antient Heroes, famous for their combating so many Giants, and Dragons, and Robbers, were in their own Persons, a greater Nuisance to Mankind, than any of those Monsters they subdued; And therefore, to render their Obligations more compleat, when all *other* Vermin were destroyed, should in Conscience have concluded with the same Justice upon themselves. (*Tale*, I.57)

So, too, the critic, having performed his work combating the vermin of the world of letters should not wear out his welcome. Indeed, the critic is, for Swift, *he who wears out his welcome*. The hero-critic has this ambivalence already built in—it is in the nature of the critic to make hospitable hosts into wearied and unwilling ones. The critic is a parasite who comes garbed as a hero, offering something new that offers more satisfyingly critical perspective on those he helps to designate enemies. Thus, if hospitality were to be served,

> [I]t would be very expedient for the Publick Good of Learning, that every *True Critick*, as soon as he had finished his Task assigned, should immediately deliver himself up to the Ratsbane, or Hemp, or from some convenient Altitude… (*Tale*, I.57)

Gulliver operates in his final voyage as just such a hero-critic, offering a critical perspective on the vermin of Houyhnhnmland (the Yahoos) that allows the Houyhnhnms to first consider their extermination, and then to see Gulliver himself as the lingering vermin, best given ratsbane or forced into exile, for the good of the Houyhnhnms' social cohesion.

The horses have debated the question before—in fact, it is "the only Debate which ever happened in that Country"—"whether the *Yahoos* should be exterminated from the Face of the Earth" (*GT* 249). But this time there is a difference: Gulliver's Master Houyhnhnm has engaged the Grand Assembly with the prospect of a Yahoo who has all of the traits of a Houyhnhnm. Gulliver comes to the assembly in this virtual way with a solution: castration of the Yahoos. The prospect of making geldings of the brutish beasts operates for us to continue the defamiliarizing perspective on human viciousness toward animals that Gulliver had introduced in his early conversations with his Master. It also works to associate the Yahoos more strongly with animals, offering a more "humane" solution than that of the genocide desired by many Houyhnhnms. We do not find out whether Gulliver successfully reduces the call for genocide by encouraging, through his countrymen's example, the castration of the animal humans. But this moment aligns Gulliver with the other heroes who arrive to offer solutions to pernicious plagues or infestation—Hercules, the Pied Piper of Hamelin.

Successful or not, this new perspective on the Yahoos allows them to be seen as working animals, as animals bred for labor. The question of genocide had not drawn any of its reasons from this fact—instead, a list of petty grievances are offered that explain why the Yahoos are no better than vermin. "That, as the *Yahoos* were the most filthy, noisome, and deformed Animal which Nature ever produced, so they were the most restive and indocible, mischievous and malicious" (*GT* 249). They are a population of undomesticable animals that have been unfortunately brought into the rudiments of domestication, subsisting in a kind of borderland existence between savagery and civilization. Barely suitable for any kind of service, the Yahoos are utterly without value for the horses, and if released into the wildness of their non-domesticated state, would represent nothing but a threat to the Houyhnhnms, parasitical at best, thoroughly despicable and wretched, and demanding destruction.

The valences of this discussion that parallel questions of human slaves in the Americas are unmistakable—indeed, a similar logic is used by Jefferson later in the century to assert that if slaves were to be freed, they would necessarily need to be sent away so as to not operate as a threat to social stability.[xvi] Gulliver's depiction of the Yahoos, presented by his proxy at the congress, reinvents them as primarily animals who can and will work, and who would be made "tractable and fitter for Use" by gelding. Promoting a solution that would result in their population's dwindling, and gradual replacement with animals who would even more properly accept the role of laborer, Gulliver offers the Houyhnhnms a rationale for genocide even stronger than the list of petty complaints (suckling the cows' teats, trampling oats and grasses, killing cats) that were all their endless debate seems to have been able to generate.

Gulliver essentially provides the Houyhnhnms with the Lilliputians' eventual inhospitable determination towards his presence in that kingdom (in which they had decided to blind him and starve him until he wasted away into death (*GT* 67-8). As work animals who fail at the purpose they have been given, the only thing that gives them value, the Yahoos are doubly deserving of a rationally organized depopulation that will systematically reduce their numbers *and* extract their labor until their end.

None of this fits with Gulliver's depiction of Houyhnhnm hospitality, but it is not clear merely from the antinomy of their absolute hospitality and their hatred for the Yahoos that some kind of judgment is being offered by the text, some kind of irony that would ask us to judge the Houyhnhnms according to the positions of the "hard" or "soft" schools. The pettiness of the complaints casts the shadow of irony on the proceedings. And the fact that Gulliver's Master Houyhnhnm, who throughout the tale speaks to Gulliver as the representative of the logic of Houyhnhnm culture, has approved of the prospect of systematic castration indicates that it is not at all antithetical to Houyhnhnm custom or thought. But regardless of the question of the text's judgment toward the hospitality given to Yahoos, we are faced with the fact that the Houyhnhnms begin to consider Gulliver to be only a Yahoo, and therefore not worthy of the hospitality he has been receiving. Gulliver has exceeded his welcome—he has come to change the Houyhnhnms' perspective on the Yahoos, and in doing so they have had to consider the boundaries of their self-definition. This self-questioning has by time made them defensive: paranoiacally, they begin to fantasize Gulliver's rational gifts as potentially revolutionary—horrifyingly so. "It was to be feared, I would be able to seduce [the Yahoos] into the woody and mountainous Parts of the Country, and bring them in Troops by Night to destroy the *Houyhnhnms'* Cattle" (*GT* 256). "So it is the indeed the master, the one who invites, the inviting host, who becomes the hostage—and who really always has been" (Derrida, 123). Gulliver has brought the supplementation of conscious self-categorization to his hosts, but in so doing becomes thoroughly pernicious, only parasitical in his further presence with his hosts. He is the critic who has outlived his utility and who remains, attempting to remain ingratiated while nevertheless operating as a sign of hostility inside of hospitable social relations.

The critic Gulliver attempts his ingratiating maneuvers by thoroughly rejecting and critiquing his former identity—his status as human has come to seem to him to be a badge of dishonor, and so here we get the most savage and thorough excoriation of British culture, from its treatment of animals in the domicile to its treatment of colonial others at its peripheries. Gulliver as critic must thoroughly denounce one identity in order to affiliate himself with another. But this is an effort that has ceased to be of service to the hosts—beyond the initial critique of the Yahoos Gulliver's presence allows, he offers no return for their hospitality. The critic—the writer who, like Bentley, Wotton, Dennis or others, pronounces judgment on the works of others in order to further only his own critical career—is the figure who has,

from the Scriblerian perspective, always already exceeded his welcome. Devaluing even the heroic act that the critic performs—refiguring whatever the critic initially may offer as a kind of necessary evil at best—the critique of criticism offered from the perspective of this progress of satire demands that criticism be evaluated according to the question of hospitality. The critic is the ungrateful guest who, not perceiving his host's displeasure, remains as a hostile force in the house of the host, transforming the space of hospitality into a space always burdened by a threat or a nuisance. Satire rejects criticism, as it does modernity, domestication, and faction, on the grounds of its failure of hospitality. While criticism may, in a sense, bring us to ourselves, or help to define the enveloping space in which hospitality occurs, *Gulliver's Travels* refuses to accept that the practice of critical judgment can preserve the hospitable possibilities it unleashes. Satire must not accept its role as that of criticism. To do so would introduce excess parasitism and violate the law of hospitality.

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[i] See Pope, et al.

[ii] This distinction will prove very important as we consider the elaboration of the question of satire's relation to hospitality. The pathos of the scene is limited because of Gulliver's size and the power it always holds in reserve, and the encounter does not seem to threaten to become a situation in which we might feel for Gulliver as the vulnerable outsider, bereft of everything including his own language. For Derrida, "[a]mong the serious problems we are dealing with here is that of the foreigner who, inept at speaking the language, always risks being without defense before the law of the country that welcomes or expels him; the foreigner is first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc. He has to ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the lord, the authorities, the nation, the state, the father, etc" (Derrida, 15). Nearly all of these terms are technically accurate for Gulliver's entry into Lilliput, but the text deflects our concern for Gulliver—in part because he himself seems so little upset by the encounter. This turn away from pathos is significant—just as, within the text as a whole, there is no true example of ideal hospitality, there is likewise no true example of the indigent stranger, utterly pathetic in the depths of his defenselessness. Gulliver's entrance as defenseless vermin into Brobdingnag is colored by our own understanding of his power in this relation to the Lilliputians and the *ex post facto* nature of the narration—we know the adventurer returns from his experience with the other. But it is also colored by his willingness in each case to become something other than a foreigner—to find a place within the new relations that greet him.

[iii] Felicity Heal notes the dwindling productions of cities and towns directed at royal visits. By the eighteenth century, such hospitality was part of the myth of a feudal past at best. See Heal, 307-8.

[iv] I am thinking here of the many great nineteenth-century texts on "the crowd" such as those by Le Bon, Tarde, and later, Freud, *Group Psychology*, that offer the emergence of crowd formations as a new kind of social being and relation to the ego. Swift himself has much to say about crowds in *A Tale of a Tub*, in a very real sense anticipating many of these later works.

[v] Louis I. Bredvold's essay "The Gloom of the Tory Satirists" sums up the general rhetorical position toward faction shared by Swift and his political and aesthetic allies. "A political party—that is, the party one was opposed to—was a faction seeking to disrupt the national unity. To give up one's neutrality and become a party man, even with the right party, was in a sense a sacrifice of moral position and justifiable only because the nation was in danger." In Part 1, Gulliver seeks to navigate away from faction by serving what he perceives to be national interest, finding only that faction is already there preceding him. See the essay in *Pope and his Contemporaries*, 7. For a candid expression of Swift's depiction of faction see his *Sentiments of a Church of England Man*, 24. In his *Discourse of the Contests and Dissentions* in the same volume (229), Swift depicts the strife caused by faction as a component of a political "*Sickness unto Death.*"

[vi] For a good, broad historical account of British liberty, see Linda Colley's *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837*, especially the discussion of Wilkes, where the earlier, latent national character of liberty is focused in a quasi-populist xenophobia in the 1760s (105-116). Colley describes the political uses to which public spectacle was put on election day on p. 51.

[vii] See Jonathan Lamb's wonderful essay "Longinus, the Dialectic, and the Practice of Mastery" in which he mounts a critique of the association between the Longinian sublime and the Hegelian dialectic, especially in terms of the sublime's relation to power. For the significance of Longinus to the Scriblerians, including Swift, see Knight.

[viii] For a provocative theorization of the active forms of resistance exhibited by crowds and masses, see Baudrillard, who depicts a general massification of a "silent majority" that is fundamentally resistant to knowledge, codification, stratification, etc. Practices of advertising, statistics, polling, sociology, demography—all are attempts by the State to fully capture this mass that has sprung into being in modernity. All of these methods, according to Baudrillard, fundamentally fail—the dark cloud of the mass can only be captured at its edges, at its most translucent and reflective points: its silver lining. The masses are both a dark density and a reflective luminosity—"[t]he masses, on the contrary, accept everything and redirect everything *en bloc* into the spectacular, without requiring any other code, without requiring any meaning, ultimately without resistance, but making everything slide into an indeterminate sphere which is not even that of non-sense, but that of overall manipulation/fascination" (43-4). This is to say that the power of the mass, the mode in which it functions as a resistance, is its deterritorialization of the coding aimed at encompassing it, the transformation of this manipulation into a spectacular that cannot be made sensible. It is through the *hyper*-compliance with power that the masses are a form of resistance.

[ix] See Colley, 101-132.

[x] See Sigmund Freud. *The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious*, 143.

[xi] For the Somerset case and its historical context, see Wise.

[xii] For the historical context of animal ethics and pet ownership, see Thomas, esp Ch 3.

[xiii] Heal notes that "[t]he idea of a 'law of hospitality,' that is, a clearly formulated series of conventions that dictated particular behavior towards outsiders, is a late arrival in the writing of the early modern period. It seems to depend upon an awareness of the Roman *ius hospitii*, and of the Stoic tradition of natural law, and hence to be a humanist import" (Heal, 4). The texts which began appearing in the late sixteenth century that formulated the rules of this 'law' also in a sense announced its demise—as these texts began appearing, so too did announcements about the death of hospitality's death—"a rising chorus of laments that hospitality was dead, or at the very least dying" (Heal, 93). Likewise, Heal notes that increased attention to Cicero and Seneca in the seventeenth century were productive of increased rationalization of individualism and "moral calculus," rather than broader conceptions of hospitality (Heal, 101).

[xiv] Heal observes that "[b]y the first decade of the seventeenth century it seems that any writer on society who did not allude, at least *en passant*, to the decay of hospitality, was failing to observe one of the conventions of his genre" (94).

[xv] Derrida, looking to the linguistic anthropology of Benveniste, reminds us that the law of hospitality in the absolute sense that is dictated here—in other words, when directed to the stranger in a universal sense—"requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner… but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I *give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names" (Derrida, 25). The extent to which the Houyhnhnms fall short of the absolute hospitality claimed for them by Gulliver is very important for the text's allegorical treatment of satire's progress.

[xvi] See especially Jefferson's *Autobiography*, 44.